Why Texas feels less subprime stress than U.S. by Anil Kumar
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2008 SouthwestEconomy 3
Differences in economic   
factors and mortgage   
characteristics give the state a 
lower delinquency rate.
Why Texas Feels Less  
Subprime Stress than U.S.
By Anil Kumar
Subprime loans and other high-risk mort-
gages grew rapidly for several years before 
falling U.S. housing prices and steep in-
creases in defaults and foreclosures touched 
off the global economy’s most severe finan-
cial crisis in decades. Except for a brief pe-
riod, Texas homebuyers relied more heavily 
than borrowers nationwide on subprime 
mortgages. Yet, troubles with these loans 
aren’t as severe in Texas. 
According to the Mortgage Bankers 
Association, the state matched the nation in 
2005 with 8 percent of its subprime mort-
gages more than 60 days past due or in 
foreclosure. By the second quarter of 2008, 
the nation’s rate had risen to 20 percent, 
well above Texas’ 14 percent.
Broad economic factors explain part of 
Texas’ better subprime loan performance.1 
Texas has grown faster than most other 
states in recent years, and housing prices 
have held steady. Worst hit in the subprime 
fallout have been California, Florida, Ne-
vada and Arizona, states in which housing 
prices have plunged after soaring earlier in 
this decade.
Subprime mortgage characteristics may 
also shed light on the gaps in states’ default 
rates. On average, Texas subprime borrow-
ers have more equity in their homes than 
those in other states, providing larger cush-
ions against default. 
The state relies less on exotic mortgag-
es, such as interest-only or negative-amor-
tization loans. Texans with subprime loans 
are also less likely to take out adjustable-
rate mortgages (ARMs), which are subject 
to sharply higher monthly payments when 
interest rates reset. 
Due to the state’s strong predatory 
lending laws and restrictions on mortgage 
equity withdrawals, a smaller share of 
Texas’ subprime loans involve cash-out refi-
nancing, which reduces homeowner equity 
and makes default more likely when mort-
gage payments become unaffordable.
Ascent and Decline
Homebuyers with good credit ratings 
and well-documented sources of income 
usually finance through what the mortgage 
industry calls conventional loans, offering 
the lowest interest rates fixed over 15 or 30 
years. Those who can’t qualify for conven-
tional financing often turn to two types of 
higher-interest loans—subprime mortgages 
for buyers with low credit scores and Alt-A 
mortgages for borrowers with inadequate 
income documentation. 
As the housing boom gained mo-
mentum earlier in this decade, mortgage 
originators relied more on new types of 
loans. Such products as interest-only and 
negative-amortization loans allowed lenders 
to extend credit to more households and 
investors with low incomes and poor credit 
histories.2 Subprime loans with ARMs often 
carried enticingly low teaser rates.
For both Texas and the U.S., subprime 
mortgage growth took off in 2003 (Chart 1). 
For the state, the category rose from 6 per-
cent of home loans in mid-2003 to 11 per-
cent by year’s end. The share peaked at 18 
percent in mid-2007 before declining to 16 
percent in August. Both before and after the 
2003 surge, the U.S. generally trailed Texas, 
with the gap widening somewhat in the past 
two years.
Two key reasons for Texas’ relatively 
high subprime use are income and credit 
scores. The state’s median per capita house-
hold income was $47,548 in 2007, com-
pared with $50,740 for the U.S.3 About 48 
percent of subprime borrowers in Texas 
had FICO credit scores of 600 or less, com-
pared with 39 percent for the nation. 
While Texas and the U.S. had parallel 
growth paths, the state’s share of U.S. sub-
prime mortgages retreated from 7 percent 
in 2001 to 5 percent in 2004. Higher rates 
of expected housing price appreciation in 
California, Florida and elsewhere may have 
fueled faster growth of subprime mortgages 
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market started cooling elsewhere, Texas’ 
housing prices held steady and its share of 
subprime mortgages crept back up to about 
7 percent. 
When the housing bubble burst in 
parts of the country, an increasing number 
of borrowers found it hard to stay current 
on their mortgages, leading to a rise in sub-
prime delinquencies and a meltdown in the 
housing market. The residential real estate 
troubles spread to financial markets and the 
overall economy because most loans were 
packaged into mortgage-backed securities, 
tying their values to homeowners’ ability to 
make monthly payments.
According to the Mortgage Bankers 
Association, seriously delinquent mortgages 
began rising nationally in the second half of 
2005, when housing prices peaked on their 
way to a steep slide (Chart 2). In Texas, 
prices have been relatively stable, and the 
state’s subprime delinquencies increased at 
a much slower rate. 
Another measure of mortgage troubles 
tells the same story. First American LoanPer-
formance (FALP) data from the New York 
Fed show that about 7 percent of Texas 
subprime loans were 90 days past due in 
August 2008, compared with 10 percent for 
the nation. Subprime foreclosures in Texas 
were 4 percent, significantly lower than the 
nation’s 11 percent.4
How Texas Differs
Housing prices and economic condi-
tions provide a good start in explaining 
Texas’ milder subprime troubles. 
Rapidly falling housing prices erode 
equity and reduce homeowners’ incentives 
to avoid foreclosure, particularly for those 
who find their mortgage balances exceed 
their home’s value. These considerations 
are less important in Texas, where housing 
prices increased only modestly and haven’t 
fallen much. 
A weak economy can trigger defaults 
through falling incomes and job losses. 
Chart 1
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SOURCES: Mortgage Bankers Association; Haver Analytics; author’s calculations.
Chart 2
Subprime Delinquency Rises More Slowly in Texas
Percent  Percent
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NOTE: Serious delinquencies are mortgages more than 60 days past due or in foreclosure.
SOURCES: Mortgage Bankers Association; Federal Housing Finance Agency; Haver Analytics; author’s calculations.
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High subprime default states had relatively 
higher unemployment rates. Texas had low-
er delinquency and unemployment rates. 
Overall, state data indicate a strong 
negative correlation between August 2008 
delinquency rates and housing-price fluctu-
ations from second quarter 2007 to second 
quarter 2008 (Chart 3A). At the same time, 
the data show a significant positive relation-
ship between delinquencies and state un-
employment rates (Chart 3B).
Texas’ delinquency rate was less than 
would be predicted by its housing price 
appreciation and unemployment rate, sug-
gesting that other factors likely are impor-
tant in explaining differences in subprime 
delinquency across states. One factor might 
be subprime mortgage characteristics. FALP 
data show Texas subprime mortgages are 
different in many respects from U.S. loans 
of this type (Chart 4A).5 
While lower credit scores increase the 
riskiness of Texas subprime mortgages, sev-
eral other factors make the state’s subprime 
mortgages less likely to run into trouble. 
Texas subprime borrowers have more 
equity in their homes, with a median loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio of 80 percent, lower 
than the nation’s 87 percent ratio. 
At just 1 percent, Texas’ use of interest-
only loans as of August 2008 was less than 
the nation’s 11 percent. Since borrowers 
delay payment of only the principal on 
these loans for a specified period, the initial 
interest is higher than for traditional mort-
gages. After the interest-only period expires, 
mortgage payments can rise sharply.
In addition, the state has relied less on 
negative-amortization loans, another cat-
egory particularly vulnerable to default. 
Forty-five precent of Texas borrowers 
had ARMs, compared with 65 percent for 
the U.S. The state also has a much smaller 
share of subprime ARMs scheduled to reset 
in the next year. Many subprime borrow-
ers default because interest rates on ARM 
loans reset to higher rates and increase pay-
ments.6 As a result, ARMs are more likely to 
default than fixed-rate loans.
Texas has a lower incidence of sub-
prime loans for cash-out refinancing. Forty-
two percent of Texas subprime borrowers 
used cash-out refinancing, compared with 55 
percent for the nation. 
Chart 3
Housing Prices, Unemployment  
Affect Subprime Delinquency
(2007:Q2 to 2008:Q2)

































SOURCE: First American LoanPerformance data from Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, August 2008.
Chart 4



























































SOURCE: First American LoanPerformance data from Federal Reserve Bank of New York, August 2008.SouthwestEconomy    FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2008 6
A lower incidence of this type of loan is 
hardly surprising in a state with strong pred-
atory lending laws.7 In Texas, a borrower’s 
home equity can’t be less than 20 percent 
of the home’s value in order to qualify for 
an equity loan or line of credit.
What about Alt-A loans?8 According to 
FALP data, these mortgages financed 1 per-
cent of the state’s total housing units as of 
August 2008, compared with 2 percent for 
the nation. 
Texas’ Alt-A borrowers differ from the 
nation’s in many of the same ways as their 
subprime counterparts. They have higher 
LTV ratios and lower incidences of interest-
only mortgages, negative-amortization 
loans, ARMs and cash-out refinancings 
(Chart 4B). Unlike subprime mortgages, a 
larger share of Alt-A ARMs are scheduled to 
reset over the next two years in Texas than 
in the nation.
Some of these key subprime char-
acteristics are strongly correlated with 
delinquency rates among states. Positively 
sloped regression lines indicate that default 
rates tend to rise with the incidence of 
mortgages with ARMs, interest-only pay-
ments, negative amortization and cash-out 
refinancing (Chart 5). 
Although housing prices, unemploy-
ment rates and subprime mortgage at-
tributes are individually correlated with 
default rates, many of these factors may 
interact with one another, making relation-
ships more complex. 
For example, subprime borrowers 
may have resorted to ARMs to purchase 
unaffordable homes. For many of them, 
incomes couldn’t keep pace with rising 
mortgage payments as interest rates reset. 
When housing prices were rising, borrow-
ers could refinance their way out of default. 
However, housing price growth decelerated 
in parts of the country with high incidences 
of subprime mortgages, compromising 
homeowners’ ability to keep their homes.
A model for subprime delinquencies 
that accounts for many factors simultane-
ously explains nearly 75 percent of the 
overall variation in subprime delinquencies. 
Four factors stand out: the unemployment 
rate, the percentage of cash-out refinanc-
ings, the percentage of ARMs and housing 
price appreciation (Table 1). Other factors 
aren’t statistically significant. 
Most important, housing price appre-
ciation and the unemployment rate each 
have an economically large impact on de-
linquency. A 1 percentage point increase in 
price appreciation reduces delinquencies 
0.82 percentage point. If the unemploy-
ment rate rises 1 percentage point, troubled 
loans go up more than 1 percentage point. 
A percentage-point increase in cash-out 
refinancings pushes delinquencies 0.35 per-
centage point higher, and the same increase 
in ARMs sends delinquencies 0.15 percent-
age point higher. 
As the model predicts, Texas has a 
lower delinquency rate because its housing 
prices appreciated modestly. In addition, 
the economy has been stronger in Texas 
than in most states and its unemployment 
rate has been lower. The state also has a 
lower incidence of ARMs and mortgages for 
cash-out refinancing.
State data on subprime mortgage de-
linquencies suggest that housing prices and 
local economic factors are still the primary 
drivers of subprime default rates. Even so, 
mortgage characteristics also matter—from 
the incidence of ARMs to the purpose for 
which the loan was taken out. In general, 
cash-out refinancing loans are more prone 
to delinquency than loans for outright pur-
chases. 
Recent tightening of credit standards 
in the mortgage market has put a lid on the 
growth of subprime and exotic mortgages. 
Nevertheless, a sharply deteriorating econ-
omy, weak home sales and a continued 
downward trend in housing prices suggest 
Chart 5
Mortgage Characteristics Explain  
States’ Subprime Delinquency
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SOURCE: First American LoanPerformance data from Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, August 2008.
Table 1
Determinants of Subprime  
Delinquency
Characteristic Coefficient
Percent lagged  
unemployment rate
1.43**
Percent cash-out refinance 
loans
.35**
Percent ARM loans .15*
Percent lagged housing price 
appreciation
– .82**






Percent interest-only loans – .05
Average FICO score – .10
*Significant at 10 percent.
**Significant at 5 percent.
SOURCES: First American LoanPerformance data from 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, August 2008; author’s 
calculations.
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that delinquencies and foreclosures will 
continue at a high level. 
The Texas housing market has shown 
substantial weakening in 2008, even though 
the state’s housing prices have held up bet-
ter than the nation’s.9 The financial turmoil 
and credit crisis, coupled with low energy  
prices, have made it more likely that the 
region will follow the nation in an eco-
nomic downturn. This suggests that Texas 
will inch closer to the U.S in subprime de-
linquency.
Kumar is a senior economist in the Research  
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
The author thanks Keith Phillips and Wenhua Di for 
comments and helpful discussion. 
1 See “Mortgage Delinquencies and Foreclosures,” speech by 
Ben S. Bernanke, chairman of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, at Columbia Business School’s 32nd 
Annual Dinner, New York, May 5, 2008.
2 Interest-only mortgages are adjustable-rate mortgages with 
the option of paying only the interest for a specified period 
rather than interest plus part of the principal, as in traditional 
mortgages. Mortgage payments would typically increase 
sharply on such loans after the specified period because 
borrowers would have to start paying a principal amortized 
over a much shorter period than usual. Negative-amortization 
loans go a step further and allow borrowers to pay interest 
on an amount lower than the principal for a specified period. 
The remaining interest is added to the principal amount 
and becomes due after the specified period. With negative-
amortization loans, mortgage payments in later years rise 
even more sharply than with interest-only loans. See “Making 
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